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Abstract
Contextualists and relativists about predicates of personal taste, epistemic
modals, etc. (“CR-expressions”) agree that the interpretation of these expres-
sions depends, in some sense, on context. Relativists claim that the sort of
context-sensitivity exhibited by CR-expressions is importantly diﬀerent from
that exhibited by paradigm context-sensitive expressions, like deĕnite descrip-
tions, demonstratives, quantiĕers, etc. is bifurcation is oen motivated by
the claim that the two classes of expressions behave diﬀerently in patterns of
agreement and disagreement. I provide cases illustrating that the same sorts of
discourse phenomena that have been thought problematic for contextualists
can arise with paradigm context-sensitive expressions. ese cases motivate
a more uniĕed treatment of paradigm context-sensitive expressions and the
expressions that have ĕgured in recent contextualism-relativism debates.
Keywords contextualism; relativism; context-sensitivity; disagreement; accommo-
dation & negotiation; epistemic modals
*anks to Scott Sturgeon and audiences at the University of Leeds, Centre for Metaphysics and
Mind, the University of Glasgow, and the University of Birmingham for helpful discussion.

A contextualist about an expression claims that the content of that expression de-
pends on features of the context of utterance. We are all contextualists about pure
indexicals whose contents are determined by speciĕc linguistic rules. ‘I’, for instance,
invariably refers to the speaker of the context. But not all expressions whose inter-
pretation is intuitively sensitive to context lend themselves to so straightforward
an analysis. ere are Perry’s (, ) intentional indexicals whose content is,
plausibly, determined in part by pragmatic factors, like speaker intentions. Demon-
stratives, quantiĕers, and even ‘here’ and ‘now’ likely fall in this camp. Such ‘impure
indexicals’ raise many questions about how context aﬀects utterance interpretation.
But, details of the semantics and metasemantic aside, we all grant that the contents
of these expressions depends in some sense on features of the context of utterance.
In addition, there is a range of expressions whose interpretation is intuitively sen-
sitive to context, but which are such that no particular way of spelling out their
context-sensitivity seems capable of capturing all our intuitions. It is these expres-
sions that are the locus of— and, depending on one’s taste, to blame for— recent
contextualism-relativism debates. ese expressions include predicates of personal
taste, epistemic modals, ‘knows’, normative terms, and vague terms, among others.
Call these expressions CR-expressions.
A contextualist about a CR-expression must provide a general account of what
standard, information state, etc. (depending on the item in question) is supplied as
a function of the context of utterance. A central challenge has been to provide an
account that makes the intuitively correct predictions about certain discourse phe-
nomena with these expressions— in particular, how they ĕgure in patterns of agree-
ment and disagreement, and how the context of utterance aﬀects their interpreta-
tion. Many have argued that these discourse phenomena (to be described) cannot
be captured within a contextualist semantics— i.e., that they cannot be captured by
treating a particular information state, standard, etc. determined by the context of
utterance as ĕguring in the derivation of semantic content (cf. MF :
, ). Such discourse phenomena have been used to motivate revising the classic
semantic picture by interpreting CR-expressions with respect to a ‘context of as-
sessment’ or an added parameter of the circumstance of evaluation. (Nomenclature
varies among authors.) ough the resulting (so-called) ‘relativist’ semantics diﬀer
in their details, they agree in distinguishing the sort of context-sensitivity of CR-
e literature is vast. See, e.g., K , MF , , , E  .
, L , E , S , Y ,  F & G ,
R , DR , S , S , .

expressions from that of paradigm context-sensitive expressions. Indeed, relativists
typically explicate their semantics for CR-expressions by distinguishing it from se-
mantics for paradigm context-sensitive expressions. No one is a relativist about ‘the’.
is is a mistake. I will show that the same discourse phenomena that have
been thought problematic for contextualists about CR-expressions can arise with
paradigm context-sensitive expressions. e cases I providemotivate amore uniĕed
treatment of paradigm context-sensitive expressions and the expressions that have
ĕgured in recent contextualism-relativism debates.
Roadmap: § describes a standard version of the argument from disagreement
against contextualism. § oﬀers structurally analogous examples with paradigm
context-sensitive expressions. § suggests developments that the dialectic might
take in response to these examples, and raises corresponding challenges for rela-
tivism and contextualism. For concreteness I will couch the discussion in terms of
epistemicmodals— i.e., epistemic uses ofmodal verbs, like ‘may’, ‘might’, and ‘must’.
 Epistemic modals
Epistemic modals are interpreted with respect to a body of information (evidence,
beliefs, knowledge, etc.). Sometimes this body of information ismade linguistically
explicit, like in ().
() In view of Sally’s evidence, the butler might be the killer.
e phrase ‘in view of Sally’s evidence’ speciĕes that it is Sally’s evidence that ĕgures
in the interpretation of ‘might’. Other times, no particular body of information is
explicitly speciĕed, like in ().
() e butler might be the killer.
Following common usage, call sentences like () bare epistemic modal sentences; and
call epistemic modals that occur in such sentences bare epistemic modals. (Hereaer
by ‘epistemic modal’ I will mean “bare epistemic modal,” and by ‘epistemic modal
sentence (/utterance, /assertion, /claim)’ I willmean “bare epistemicmodal sentence
(/utterance, /assertion, /claim).”)
Contextualists and relativists agree, against invariantists, that the truth value of
an epistemic modal sentence can vary across parameters of interpretation (contexts
Such diﬀerences in which epistemic relation is relevant for the interpretation of epistemic
modals will not matter in what follows. For recent defenses of invariantism about ‘might’, see B
, B .

of utterance, circumstances of evaluation, contexts of assessment) even if every-
thing else in the world remains constant. Contextualists claim that this context-
dependence is to be understood as a dependence of the semantic (conventional)
content of an epistemic modal on features of the context of utterance, those features
that determine some contextually relevant information state. To a ĕrst approxima-
tion, the semantic content of () is the proposition that B is compatible with i, where
B is the proposition that the butler is the killer, and i is the contextually relevant in-
formation state.
Epistemic modals are subject to what Mark Richard (, ) nicely glosses
as accommodation and negotiation (cf. L ). Intuitively, in uttering () one
proposes, perhaps among other things, that B be treated as a live possibility in the
conversation. If the hearer doesn’t object— if she accommodates—then the conver-
sational common ground is set as the speaker’s utterance requires. But if the hearer
does object, negotiation can ensue about who the killer is. e putative problem is
that these discourse phenomena appear to be in tension with the contextualist’s se-
mantics. ere doesn’t seem to be any way of specifying the contextually relevant
information state that explains both how we’re in a position to make the epistemic
modal claims that we seem licensed inmaking (call it the justiĕed use condition), and
how we can reasonably disagree with one another’s epistemic modal claims (call it
the disagreement condition).
Consider ().
() Alice: When is the test?
Bert: I’m not sure. e test may be on Monday.
Alice: No, the test can’t be on Monday. e teacher never gives tests right
aer the weekend. It must be later in the week.
Suppose Bert’s utterance of ()
() e test may be on Monday.
is just about his own information state. Assuming Bert is in a position to make a
claim about his own information, this captures how Bert is justiĕed in producing
his epistemic modal utterance. But it becomes unclear how Alice can reasonably
disagree with him. And it becomes unclear how in uttering ()
() No, the test can’t be on Monday.
Alice is disagreeing with Bert if each of them is making a claim about their own
information state. Alice and Bert can agree about whether the proposition M that

the test is Monday is compatible with each of their respective information states
while disagreeing with what one another says. ()–() are inconsistent, but ()–()
are not.
() As far as Bert is concerned, the test may be on Monday.
() As far as Alice is concerned, the test can’t be on Monday.
If we replace the speaker with a relevant group, and treat epistemic modal claims as
claims about the pooled information of this group, we will capture how Alice and
Bert make inconsistent claims. But then it becomes unclear how Bert is in a position
to make a claim about whether the test may be on Monday, which, intuitively, he is.
It can be appropriate for Bert to utter () even if he doesn’t know whether Alice is
uncertain aboutM.
e worry is this: If we treat epistemic modal sentences as about the speaker’s
information, we capture the justiĕed use condition but leave the disagreement con-
dition unexplained. But if we treat epistemic modal sentences as about the informa-
tion of a larger group, we capture the disagreement condition but leave the justiĕed
use condition unexplained. ere seems to be no general way of specifying what
body of information is relevant as a function of context that captures all our intu-
itions.
 Accommodation and negotiation with
paradigm context-sensitive expressions
Discussions of disagreementwithCR-expressions typically start by considering cases
that have the following structural features: (a)Autters a sentencewith aCR-expression,
(b) B felicitously responds with an expression of linguistic denial (‘no’, ‘nu-uh’, etc.)
followed by an utterance of an apparently inconsistent sentence using the same CR-
expression (or, like in (), a corresponding dual), and yet (c) the intended contents
of A’s and B’s utterances are compatible according to (an initial version of) the con-
textualist’s semantics. It has been assumed by all parties in the literature that with
paradigm context-sensitive expressions, by contrast, if the (c)-condition is satisĕed,
then the (b)-condition is violated— i.e., if the expressions are used with diﬀerent
intended contents, then linguistic denial isn’t licensed for the second speaker. is
assumption has not been made without reason. Unlike Alice’s replies in (), Dan’s
responses and disagreements in ()–() with pure indexicals, deĕnite descriptions,
pronouns, and quantiĕers (to take just four examples) are infelicitous.

() Clara: I just ĕnished teaching.
Dan: No I didn’t.
() [Context: Clara and Dan see a group of students exiting a classroom. An-
other group of students is waiting to enter.]
Clara: Look, the students (/they) just ĕnished the test.
Dan: No, the students (/they) didn’t just ĕnish. Look at those students.
() Clara: Every student is taking the test today.
Dan: No, not every student is taking it today. Students in other classes
aren’t taking it at all.
ough they use the same expressions (‘I’, ‘the children’, ‘they’, ‘every student’), Clara
and Dan are talking about diﬀerent individuals in () and diﬀerent groups of stu-
dents in ()–(). Because of the shi in the features of context relevant for ĕxing
the contents of their utterances, Clara and Dan aren’t disagreeing, nor are they ne-
gotiating about how the context is. ey are simply talking past one another.
However, closer inspection reveals that many paradigm context-sensitive ex-
pressions exhibit the same sorts of discourse behavior that we saw with epistemic
modals. is point has not been noticed in the literature.
Start with deĕnite descriptions. Suppose that Amanda and Billy are playing with
three children, twowhite and one non-white. Amanda is a racist against non-whites,
and Billy knows this. e two white children, Will andWilma, are laughing, and the
one non-white child, Nick, isn’t. Amanda says:
() Look, the children are laughing!
Roughly, () says that everyone in the most salient group of children is laugh-
ing (L , ,  H , , S ). Insofar as
Amanda intends to say something true, it is thusmutually obvious that she is assum-
ing that the most salient group of children includes onlyWill andWilma. Assuming
it is common ground that there are no non-racist grounds for treating Nick as less
salient than Will and Wilma, Amanda’s utterance of () can implicitly suggest that
“we aren’t talking about Nick” because of his race. (Indeed, it is the implicit nature
of this suggestion that can make it so destructive.) Amanda can implicitly suggest
that Nick is to be ignored on account of his race by acting in such a way that would
be appropriate only if he was.
If Billy doesn’t object to Amanda’s utterance, he will accommodate her in these
assumptions. is can set the stage for further exclusionary behavior in the future.
To avoid such a consequence, Billy might object by explicitly calling out Amanda on

her assumption; he might say something like, ‘Wait a minute, why are you ignoring
Nick?’ But Billy needn’t be so explicit; he might respond as in ().
() No, the children aren’t laughing. Nick is bored out of his mind.
Here Billy responds in such a way that assumes that Nick is included in the group
of children being talked about. He does so by acting in such a way that would be
appropriate only if Nick was so included— speciĕcally, by using ‘the children’ to
pick out a group that includes Nick. Billy can thus respond to Amanda with an
utterance that makes a contrary implicit proposal. At this point Amanda also has
several options. Recognizing the reasons for Billy’s disquiet, she might grant that
Billy is right. It can then become mutually presupposed that there are no legitimate
grounds to exclude Nick from the relevant group being discussed. But Amanda
might not be so accommodating. is can lead to (implicit or explicit) negotiation
about what group of children is salient and why.
Similar examples can be givenwith pronouns and demonstratives. In the context
for (), Amanda might instead have uttered () or ().
() Look, they are laughing!
() ose are some happy children!
Roughly, () says that everyone in the most salient group of individuals is laughing
(G  . , R ), and () says that everyone in the group of
individuals being demonstrated is a happy child (K , S ). As
above, insofar as Amanda intends to say something true, it is mutually obvious that
she is assuming that themost salient group of individuals, or the group of individuals
being demonstrated, doesn’t include Nick. Since it is common ground that there are
no non-racist grounds for excluding Nick from the set of most salient individuals or
the set of demonstrated individuals, Amanda utterances in ()–() can implicitly
suggest that Nick is inferior in some way. Again, to avoid accommodating Amanda
in these assumptions, Billy might object by explicitly calling out Amanda on her
assumption. But he need not. He might respond as in ()–().
() No they aren’t. Nick is bored out of his mind.
() No, those are a mix of happy and unhappy children.
By acting in such a way that would be appropriate only if Amanda’s assumption was
false, Billy issues a contrary implicit proposal—namely, that Nick isn’t to be ignored
because of his race. is can lead to (implicit or explicit) negotiation about which

individuals are being talked about and why.
Now turn to quantiĕers. Consider Chip, a well known sexist in America before
the ratiĕcation of the Nineteenth Amendment. Commenting to Dorothy on the
glories of American democracy, Chip says:
() Ain’t America great? Everyone can vote.
Roughly, () says that every relevant individual in America can vote— slightly less
roughly, that every individual in America who has a moral right to vote is legally
allowed to vote. Insofar as Chip intends to say something true, it is mutually ob-
vious that he is assuming that women aren’t in the class of Americans who have a
moral right to vote. To avoid accommodating Chip in this assumption, Dorothy
might object by addressing the issue explicitly; she might say something like, ‘Wait
a minute, why are you ignoring women?’ But Dorothy needn’t be so explicit. She
might respond as in ().
() No, not everyone can vote. I still can’t.
By acting in such a way that would be appropriate only if Chip’s assumption was
false, Dorothy issues a contrary implicit proposal—namely, that women aren’t to
be excluded from the conversationally relevant domain of individuals. is can lead
to (implicit or explicit) negotiation about which individuals ought to be given a legal
right to vote.
 Lessons
Call the sorts of examples from § the PCS-examples (“PCS” for Paradigm Context-
Sensitive). e PCS-examples show that we see the same patterns of accommo-
dation and negotiation with paradigm context-sensitive expressions as we do with
CR-expressions. One might take this as providing surprising new evidence for rel-
ativism’s sovereignty in the realm of context-sensitivity. I suspect I am not alone
One could recast ()–() using ‘all the children’. But since, Logic  aside, it is contentious
whether ‘all’ is quantiĕcational (L , B ), I give alternative examples with
‘every’.
Similar examples can be constructed with gradable adjectives, relational expressions (‘enemy’,
‘local’), and neutral modal verbs (‘may’, ‘must’), among others. Since it is contentious whether the
context-sensitivity of these expressions ought to be analyzed along contextualist or relativist lines, I
won’t give such examples here. It is an interesting question whether these sorts of examples can be
constructed with any paradigm context-sensitive expression. Given our purposes I remain neutral
on this issue here.

in thinking that we should be wary of this response. A more judicious response
is to reexamine the data. Who knows, perhaps there are insights about the role of
context-sensitive language in collaborative action and discourse that we have been
missing. In this spirit I would like to draw two lessons—one for the relativist, one
for the contextualist.
e initial worry for speaker versions of contextualism, recall, is that they fail
to capture how speakers in discourses like () disagree insofar as the semantics pre-
dicts that the contents of the speakers’ utterances are compatible. However, the
PCS-examples demonstrate that it cannot be a general requirement for discourse
disagreement that the intended contents of the speakers’ utterances be incompati-
ble: the interlocutors in the PCS-discourses disagree even though they are talking
about (or at least intending to talk about) diﬀerent people. is puts pressure on
the relativist who wishes to wield disagreement data against contextualism to show
that the disagreements ought not be explained in some alternative manner that is
consistent with a contextualist semantics.
Correspondingly, the PCS-examples give the contextualist a place to look for a
solution to their problems with disagreement. Perhaps by examining what is go-
ing on in these sorts of disagreements with paradigm context-sensitive expressions
we can learn something about how expressions with a contextualist formal seman-
tics can ĕgure in (dis)agreements, and, more generally, how they can be used to
manage the conversational context. is possibility should give the contextualist a
license for optimism. But it also raises a challenge. Not only must the contextual-
ist provide a positive account of what is going on in PCS-style examples; she must
also provide a concrete formal semantics for CR-expressions that meets the follow-
ing constraints. On the one hand, the semantics must be similar enough to that
of paradigm context-sensitive expressions so that the explanation of disagreement
cases with the latter expressions carries over to disagreements with CR-expressions.
On the other hand, the semantics cannot be too similar lest she fail to capture cer-
tain diﬀerences in the discourse properties of the two classes of context-sensitive ex-
pressions. For instance, even if paradigm context-sensitive expressions can ĕgure in
disagreements with the structure we are considering— roughly, where speakers ut-
ter apparently inconsistent sentences, and use the same context-sensitive expression
or even that they can’t both be ‘accurate’ in the sense of MF : –. See
 F & G : – and S  for similar points.
is strategy should be of particular interest to contextualists who wish to explain disagree-
ment phenomena in terms of the conventional meanings of CR-expressions rather than in terms
of linguistically unconstrained pragmatic mechanisms (as in, e.g., C , B &
F ).

but with an intuitively diﬀerent content— this is not the norm. e norm for such
discourses with CR-expressions is disagreement, whereas the norm for paradigm
context-sensitive expressions is talking past. e contextualist’s semantics must as-
similate CR-expressions and paradigm context-sensitive expressions in such a way
that this semantics, along with general pragmatic principles, predicts both the sim-
ilarities and the diﬀerences in how context aﬀects their interpretation, on the one
hand, and how their use aﬀects the context, on the other.
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